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1. Introduction 
The deep currency crises in Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia in the last decade were 
not only characterized by collapsing currencies or a sharp swing of international capital flows. 
An additional important feature of these crises was the fast transmission of crises across 
countries, regardless of economic fundamentals. For instance, Argentina was affected by the 
Mexican Peso crisis (1995), the Thai crisis (1997) created major turmoil in Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines, and the Russian crisis (1998) reached a seemingly 
unrelated country like Brazil. More recently, the severity of the transmission of the Brazilian 
crises (1999) to Argentina surprised many analysts given the low degree of openness of these 
countries.  
A common view is that the asset allocation and strategies of international investors, especially 
mutual funds, have led to the quick spreading of recent financial crises and the high degree of 
exchange rate instability. Given the increasing importance of international capital flows, many 
authors see international investors at the core of the recent financial distress. Until now, 
however, the literature has failed to provide strong evidence for or against this view. The 
ability to predict currency crises and exchange rate movements remains a challenging task. 
Despite a voluminous theoretical and empirical literature there is still very little agreement 
about what the true drivers of these developments are. Hence, it comes as no surprise that an 
extensive research based on work by Meese and Rogoff (1983) and Meese (1990) has shown 
that the random walk model outperforms other standard exchange rate models in out-of-
sample forecasting of exchange rate movements. This still holds even when seemingly 
relevant economic variables are included.  
This paper proceeds as follows: First, we give an overview of the theory on currency crises, 
focusing in particular on the role of herd behavior and financial contagion (Sections 2 and 3). 
A direct consequence of herd behavior and financial contagion are large and unpredictable   3
exchange rate swings, leading to high exchange rate volatility. Section 4 deals with the 
adverse macroeconomic consequences of episodes with high exchange rate volatility, 
especially in terms of labor market performance. Section 5 concludes. 
2. First and Second Generation Models of Currency Crises  
A large body of literature has identified a variety of factors that cause or influence financial 
crisis. The early work on currency crises, initiated by Krugman (1979), is characterized by 
inconsistencies in fundamental macroeconomic variables with the maintenance of a currency 
peg. In these first generation models, the government is running a lax fiscal policy and 
finances the deficit by printing money. As a consequence, the money supply grows in a way 
which is incompatible with the proclaimed level of the fixed exchange rate. Individuals 
realize this inconsistency and seek to convert large amounts of their holdings in domestic 
currency into foreign-denominated securities. As a result, the domestic currency experiences 
downward pressure. In order to defense its exchange rate commitment, the central bank is 
then forced to purchase the excessive supply of domestic currency on international financial 
markets, thereby reducing its foreign exchange reserves. Finally, if the central bank’s foreign 
reserves run low, the monetary authorities’ are forced to give up its defense of the original 
parity. According to this early work, currency crises are foreseen perfectly. This implies that 
the depreciation does not occur at the date when all reserves are exhausted, but in form of a 
speculative attack at some earlier date. Rational market participants observing the 
inconsistency between monetary expansion and the exchange rate peg act in anticipation of 
the depreciation and will start a speculative attack on the currency when the stock of reserves 
is still relatively high. 
Although first generation models well explained the causes of currency crises in the 1970s 
and 1980s, more recent crises indicated that the link between unsustainable economic policy 
and the abandonment of an exchange rate peg is not as mechanical as presumed. For instance, 
the experiences of the European crisis 1992-1993 or the Mexican Crisis 1994-95 have shown   4
that speculative attack can occur even without poor economic fundamentals. Moreover, the 
severity of the crises could not be explained by first generation models.  
In the second generation models of currency crises attention therefore shifted to how changes 
in expectations cause crises. The key point is that these models question the view of a single 
correct equilibrium. Instead, different outcomes can result, depending on economic agents’ 
expectations (see, e.g., Eichengreen et al. 1996 or Obstfeld 1996). For example, a situation 
where policies are consistent with an exchange rate commitment, resulting in strong 
fundamentals and a sufficient stock of foreign reserves can suddenly change as markets create 
the conditions for a speculative attack. The sudden shift in market expectations may be due to 
uncertainty about the future path of economic policy, in particular the willingness or the 
ability of the government to maintain the exchange rate parity. For instance, a rising 
unemployment rate increases the cost of the exchange rate commitment. Investors thus 
anticipate a future loosening of monetary policy and the abandonment of the currency peg. 
This in turn triggers a speculative attack as market participants convert their domestic assets 
into foreign currency. The key result is that crises leave the economy in a suboptimal, 
inefficient equilibrium. Crises are thus self-fulfilling as the expectation of a devaluation 
makes a devaluation more likely.  
It has been argued that the two crisis models outlined above oversee important features that 
characterize recent currency crises. First, a common feature of recent crises episodes has been 
the fast transmission of shocks across many countries. The latest explanations of currency 
crises are therefore extended to take into account contagion effects. Second, recent financial 
turmoil shows that the sudden stop or reversal of capital inflows cause severe economic 
downturns generally associated with a high exchange rate volatility.    5
3. Contagion  
The literature has used different definitions of contagion. In its most general form, contagion 
refers simply to the international transmission of shocks. Eichengreen et al. (1996) or 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) define contagion as a situation where the knowledge that there 
is a crisis elsewhere increases the likelihood of a crisis at home. A more restrictive definition 
is provided by Edwards (2000). According to his definition, contagion attributes only the 
excess co-movement that persists after common fundamentals as well as common shocks 
have been taken into account. Other authors restrict the term even further and state that 
contagion should only be applied to cases when cross-market correlation increases during 
crises episodes. 
What constitutes a contagion episode? Following Kaminsky et al. (2000) one can distinguish 
between at least three different possible channels of contagion: fundamentals-based 
contagion, common-cause contagion and pure contagion.
2 This classification guarantees to 
differentiate contagion obviously not related to changes in fundamentals from a common 
shock that affects many countries in the same way. 
3.1. Fundamental-based and common-cause contagion 
Contagion is fundamental driven if the transmission of shocks takes place through trade or 
financial links (Eichengreen et al., 1996, Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000).
3 In terms of trade 
linkages, the transmission channel may be either directly through bilateral trade or indirectly 
through competition on third markets. The resulting “spillover effects” (Masson, 1998) have 
been modeled formally by Gerlach and Smets (1995) and Eichengreen et al. (1996). The 
transmission channel starts from the observation that a currency crisis in one of our main 
                                                           
2 A further explanation of contagion is provided by Drazen (2000). The political costs (in terms of a loss of 
reputation) of the abandonment of an exchange rate commitment are lower when other countries also devalue. In 
such a context, the loss of reputation associated with the devaluation will be lower for each country and the 
willingness to give up exchange rate parity higher. Hence, the probability of a devaluation increases with other 
countries devaluing.    6
trading partner countries will result in a depreciation of the foreign currency which in turn 
weakens the domestic price competitiveness. The resulting drop in demand for domestic 
export goods will deteriorate the current account. This increases the cost of the exchange rate 
commitment and makes a devaluation more likely.  
Other authors see the global diversification of financial portfolios at the root of contagion. 
There is, in particular for emerging markets, some evidence that the stronger financial 
interdependence between countries makes it more likely that multiple countries are affected 
by the same crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), for instance, found empirical evidence in 
favor of the hypothesis that banks contributed to the propagation of the Asian crisis. Their 
theoretical explanation starts from the observation that international banks which have a large 
part of outstanding debts in a country going through a crisis, are faced with a lot of non-
performing loans. In order to cover their losses and to guarantee the quality of their portfolio, 
they will call loans and cut off credit lines in third countries. Hence, countries which were 
unaffected by the original crisis suddenly suffer from “liquidity squeezes”. The financial 
transmission will be particularly strong for those countries which are exposed to the same 
banks as the original crisis country.  
Another variant of fundamental-based contagion is common-cause contagion which occurs 
when market participants reallocate their assets on the basis of common fundamental news. 
Under the assumption of incomplete information, a crisis in one country (for instance, due to a 
deterioration of its terms of trade) will constitute a wake-up call for market participants to re-
evaluate the risks of investments in other countries with similar market fundamentals. Since 
investors get scared by the possible collapse of similar countries, they will sell the assets of 
the identified countries, thereby rapidly spreading instability to multiple countries. Empirical 
evidence by Eichengreen et al. (1996) indicates that trade links appear to be more important 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 In order to separate fundamentals-based contagion from pure or true contagion, Masson (1998) refers to this 
phenomenon “spillover”.   7
than similar fundamentals. However, given the relatively low trade linkages among emerging 
market countries, some authors have pointed out that this scenario hardly provides a general 
explanation for major crises.  
3.2. Pure or true contagion  
One of the key feature of recent financial crises was the rapid international transmission of 
shocks even to countries where the economic linkage appeared to be minor. The magnitude of 
this transmission can not be explained by real or financial fundamental linkages alone. It is 
therefore a common view that pure contagion contributed to these crises. Pure contagion 
challenges the view of efficient speculative behavior as it leads to exacerbating volatility. The 
theoretical focus on pure contagion centers around herding. Following Borensztein and Gelos 
(2003a, 45) herding can be defined as the “tendency of some market participants to buy or sell 
assets simply because they observe other investors doing so”. Markets move jointly because 
of investor’s obvious intent to copy the behavior of other market participants. The literature 
has identified different kinds for herding, both rational and irrational. Concerning the former, 
the most important reasons of herding are information cascades, fixed costs to acquire 
information and reputational concerns. Irrational herd behavior is usually explained by 
momentum trading strategies. 
Information cascades are generally considered as the most common explanation for herding 
(Bikhchandani et al. 1992, Banerjee 1992). The typical setting of this kind of approach is 
provided by two crucial assumptions. First, there is private, but imperfect information. 
However, investors also react to other actions. Second, a selling or buying wave by investors 
does not lead to corresponding price changes, essentially meaning that prices are fixed. This 
appears to be an implausible assumption for most assets. However, in the case of exchange 
rates it seems justified, given the high share of pegged exchange rates in emerging markets 
(Bikhchandami and Sharma 2001, 284).   8
The basic idea of the information cascades approach is that market participants act 
sequentially and that the first few individuals decide about the future course of action. For 
instance, an information cascade may arise when the first two investors, having wrong 
information about the country fundamentals, flee from the country. The subsequent investor 
will mimic the trade of its predecessors, disregarding its own (possibly superior) information 
as its own information is outweighed by the first two uninformed investors. As a 
consequence, all later decision makers will follow and sell the assets (or do not buy them), 
even if they are better informed than the first investors about the country fundamentals. 
However, as their private information is not revealed by their action, the information by the 
following investors is not added to the “public pool of knowledge” (Bikhchandani and 
Sharma, 2001, 286) and will therefore not have any influence on investment decisions. The 
concept of the information cascades shows that even when market participants act rationally, 
a country with sound fundamentals is not protected by a speculative attack. Moreover, the 
equilibrium is extremely fragile as with the arrival of new information there may start an 
information cascade in the other direction, thereby leading to excess volatility. 
A related theoretical explanation for herding starts from the idea that it is costly to acquire 
information. Calvo and Mendoza (2000) argue that as the world becomes more globalized, 
optimal portfolio diversification results in a higher degree of contagion and financial 
volatility. The authors develop a model of an integrated financial market with incomplete 
information and identical mean-variance optimizing investors. The investors can choose 
whether or not to pay for relevant country-specific information to eliminate the idiosyncratic 
uncertainty of an investment in an emerging market economy. The authors show that the 
willingness of global investors to acquire and process country-specific information declines as 
global market integration progresses and the number of countries on the market increases. In 
such a context, demand for emerging market’s assets is likely to be highly sensitive to rumors 
what may result in rumor-initiated contagion. The effect is aggravated by an incentive   9
structure that incurs a cost to asset managers when they underperform in the market. It is then 
rational for an risk averse investor to imitate the given benchmark.  
The model by Calvo and Mendoza (2000) and the information cascades bear several policy 
implications. If herding and contagion effects can arise due to low costly information about 
international investment, these effects should be less prevalent in countries that have more 
transparent macroeconomic policies. When more and accurate information is provided by the 
authorities, uncertainty is reduced and capital inflows are more sustainable. In line with these 
argument, Gelos and Wei (2003) find that herding is less pronounced in more transparent 
countries. 
A third explanation of herding behavior has emphasized reputational concerns of fund 
managers. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) show that it can be rational for a fund manager to 
disregard its own information and imitate its peers so that she can not be identified as a 
manager with low skills. The effect may be aggravated by the underlying compensation 
structure of fund managers. The relationship between the fund manager and his employer 
entails a principal-agent relationship as the agent (the manager) has more information 
concerning profit opportunities than the principal (the employer). Particularly in an 
international context, when monitoring costs are high as there is high uncertainty about the 
fund manager’s ability to invest in the right assets, it is optimal for the principal to stick the 
manager’s redemption to his performance in comparison with his peers. Such a performance 
contract provides an incentive for the fund manager to copy its benchmark. If other managers 
have also relative performance contracts, their behavior would be based on herding. Disyatat 
and Gelos (2001) provide empirical evidence for models suggesting that international 
investors follow the benchmark to which their performance is measured against. 
Another form of instability is due to irrational behavior of individuals. Momentum trading or 
positive feedback strategies describe the behavior of market participants to systematically buy 
assets which have recently performed above-average and sell assets which have performed   10
below-average. This behavior is irrational since prices should already include all available 
information. Hence, the strategy to buy “past winners” and sell past “losers” because of the 
expectation that an asset whose value has been increasing recently will rise faster than the 
price of an asset whose value has been decreasing, drives prices away from fundamentals and 
is incompatible with the assumption that economic information is processed efficiently. 
(Bikhchandani and Sharma, 282). 
While the theoretical work on contagion has provided a bulk of explanation for contagion and 
herding, the empirical evidence on this subject is still relatively thin. Despite some progress in 
recent years, measuring the extent of herding still poses a major challenge to empirical 
analyses. The main problem is that it is difficult to distinguish between fundamental-based 
contagion and true contagion. In most cases, several factors will contribute to the crisis 
transmission. As long as data about individual market expectations are not available, 
empirical support will be hard to find. 
Due to this difficulties, most studies focus only on regions or several countries and use data 
on quarterly or even semi-annual basis. Borensztein and Gelos (2003a, 2003b) who focus on 
differences in behavior across different types of funds on a global scale are one of the rare 
exceptions from this. Using data on a more disaggregated level than previous studies and 
armed with a new dataset collected on emerging markets worldwide, the authors find 
statistically significant evidence for herding although the degree appears to be lower than 
often expected so that international investors can hardly be blamed for the high volatility in 
financial markets. Some of their most important results are as follows. There seem to be large 
differences in the behavior of funds as precisely, open-end funds tend to herd more than 
closed-end funds. This finding indicates that individual investors tend to herd more than 
institutional investors. In line with this finding, the authors detect a leader-follower 
relationship as individual investors tend to flee from vulnerable countries first.   11
Another leader-follower-relationship is prevalent with regard to single-country and global-
country funds. Single-country funds appear to have better country-specific information and as 
a consequence, their strategy will be imitated by multi-country fund’s managers. However, 
and in contrast to previous research by Kaminsky et al. (2000), the degree of herding does not 
appear to be more accentuated during crises episodes. Finally, Borensztein and Gelos (2003a) 
find empirical evidence for momentum strategies in liquid markets, though the overall effects 
is only moderate.  
4. Real impacts of exchange rate variability in the wake of currency crises 
The previous considerations show that it is difficult to prove that international investors can 
be blamed for the recent financial turmoil in many emerging market countries. Furthermore, 
one could argue that large swings in capital flows in response to economic shocks generally 
are welfare improving relative to less exchange rate volatility in face of the same shock. 
Exchange rate swings can smooth out abrupt changes in the terms of trade. Hence, why 
should politicians and economists care about exchange rate volatility? The answer is that that 
part of exchange rate volatility which is not caused by movements of fundamentals can do 
harm to an economy in several ways. Unexpected spikes in volatility, a phenomenon which 
frequently occurs during crisis episodes, might have real effects, for example through the 
trade channel. Unfortunately, a large empirical literature on this issue has not been able to 
document a strong link between exchange rate variability and the volume of trade. However, 
recent research shows that the absence of a strong impact of exchange rate variability on the 
volume of trade does not imply that exchange rate variability may not have adverse 
consequences on the real economy. There is strong empirical evidence that exchange rate 
variability has had a statistically significant - and economically non-negligible - negative 
impact on labor market performance in a number of regions across the world. For instance, 
Belke and Gros (2002) find a positive impact of exchange rate volatility on unemployment 
and a negative effect on employment and investment for most EU member countries   12
(including France and Germany), a result which is consistent with further studies by Buscher 
and Mueller 1999 and Stirboeck and Buscher 2000. These findings had an important bearing 
on the evaluation of costs and benefits of EMU. A second category of studies deals with the 
costs of transatlantic, i.e. euro-dollar exchange rate variability, in real terms. Results by 
Belke and Gros (2002) indicate that transatlantic exchange rate variability does have a 
significant negative impact on labor markets in the EU, and possibly also in the US. The basic 
idea behind these studies is that volatility matters because employment and investment 
decisions have some degree of irreversibility in those cases where rigidities matter. These 
decisions are discouraged by exchange rate variability as can be shown in a variety of 
economic models, mostly of the Dixit-Pindyck style. 
However, more important in our context are the negative effects of exchange rate variability 
in emerging markets. With the exception of the European Crisis 1992-1993, all recent 
financial crises took place in these countries. The main purpose of the remainder is thus to 
evaluate the costs of the present exchange rate systems among (a) the currencies of the 
Southern Cone countries vis-à-vis the dollar or the euro and (b) the CEEC currencies vis-à-vis 
the euro. The following passages heavily rely on some own recent work by the authors 
themselves. 
4.1 The Cost of Financial Market Variability in the Southern Cone 
Belke and Gros (2002a, 2003) evaluate the costs and benefits of exchange rate (and interest rate) 
stability for the Mercosur Countries Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. In general, the 
results of Belke and Gros (2002a, 2003) are rather strong in that they find in almost all cases, 
and despite extensive robustness tests, that exchange rate and interest rate variability have a 
significant impact on investment and employment. Moreover, one would have expected that 
economies with relatively closer ties to the U.S. like Brazil would show a stronger impact of 
dollar exchange rate variability, a result confirmed by the data. The estimated impact coefficients 
for Argentina were in most of the cases smaller than for Brazil.    13
These results have important implications for the debate on exchange rate policy in Mercosur. 
By accepting the main result of these studies one could jump to the policy conclusion that fixing 
exchange rates either within the Mercosur or against G-3 currencies should bring about 
significant benefits. The estimates are not precise enough to decide which option would yield 
larger benefits. One key aspect for emerging markets in this context is the relationship between 
exchange rate and interest rate variability. Whether there are benefits from fixing the exchange 
rate depends essentially on whether the gains from suppressing exchange rate variability are lost 
if the volatility reappears elsewhere, for example in a higher interest rate variability or the slow 
build up of large disequilibria. In Europe, a country that fixes its exchange rate to an external 
anchor (the DM in the past, the euro today) can expect that its domestic interest rate will be 
determined by the interest rate in the anchor country. Hence, exchange rate and interest rate 
variability can be expected to go together. However, for emerging markets, for which the country 
risk premium is so much higher and variable, this is not necessarily the case. We would therefore 
argue that fixing the exchange rate might be beneficial if the underlying policies are compatible 
with this choice. This is a big if as the experience of Argentina shows. If fiscal policy is out of 
control, then fixing the exchange rate might just suppress the appearance of the true problem 
temporarily. In the case of Argentina, one might even argue that the currency board worked too 
well for too long, thus allowing a considerable dis-equilibrium to accumulate under the surface. 
The explosion that followed in the end then might have such high costs that it can easily offset 
the benefits of a stable exchange rate that were accumulated in the preceding 10 years. In sum, 
we maintain that the high degree of exchange rate variability observed from time to time in 
Mercosur has tangible economic costs, but that fixing exchange rates was too often considered a 
free lunch by irresponsible politicians.  
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4.2 Costs of Exchange Rate Variability for Labor Markets: Empirical Evidence from the 
CEE Economies 
Let us now turn to the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs in the following). In the 
same vein as for other regions of the world, Belke and Setzer (2003, 2003a) investigate to what 
extent high exchange rate variability can be made partly responsible for the depressing 
developments in CEEC labor markets. At the beginning of the transition process it was widely 
assumed that the sharp immediate increase in open unemployment would be of a temporary 
nature only. The recent economic slowdown in the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs in the following) has been accompanied by high unemployment rates. Though this was 
partly due to unfavorable developments in world markets, longer-term effects of structural 
change in the candidate economies have also played an important role. The situation in the 
individual countries is, of course, highly differentiated, with Hungary and Estonia at the lower 
bound and Slovakia, Poland and Bulgaria at the upper bound, with unemployment rates 
exceeding 15 per cent. Yet, in all candidate countries labor markets suffer from structural 
rigidities that, in combination with continued restructuring, will put a lower limit on reductions in 
the unemployment rates. 
The results of the studies by Belke and Setzer (2003, 2003a) suggest that the high degree of 
exchange rate variability observed from time to time in the CEECs has contributed to the poor 
labor market performance in the CEECs. We investigate both effective and bilateral euro 
exchange rate variability since we were interested in the costs of exchange rate variability in 
general (effective volatilities) and in evaluating one partial benefit of euroization – the 
elimination of the exchange rate risk – in particular (bilateral volatilities vis-à-vis the euro). In 
general, our results are rather strong in that we find that exchange rate variability in many 
cases has a significant impact on the unemployment rate. Moreover, the results confirm the 
expectation that economies with relatively closer ties with the euro zone, such as the Czech 
Republic, would show a stronger impact of euro exchange rate variability. This systematic   15
correlation between openness and the strength of the impact of exchange rate volatility on 
trade corresponds to the general finding of the literature, which is that for emerging markets 
this channel is much more important. 
The results obtained warrant a new look at the costs and benefits of joining EMU or of using 
early euroization
4 as a strategy to fulfill the Maastricht criterion of exchange rate stability. We 
argue that early entry strategies might be motivated with an eye to the benefits resulting from 
suppressed exchange rate volatility. In this event one might come to the conclusion that, for 
some of the CEECs and other countries in similar situations, monetary integration with the 
euro area would be the optimal monetary policy strategy. 
5. Conclusions 
One common feature of recent currency crises has been the strong deviation of the exchange 
rate from fundamentals, thereby triggering a high exchange rate volatility. Though it is hard to 
blame international investors for this development, the constant threat of speculative attacks 
on emerging market currencies has tangible economic costs. A number of studies has shown 
that high exchange rate uncertainty contributes to the poor unemployment performance in 
many emerging market economies. This insight might have some bearing with respect to the 
choice of the exchange rate regime. 
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